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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
SANTIAGO DIAZ CRESPO,
Defendant and Appellant.

:
:

Case No. 890478-CA
Priority #2

:
:
:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a final judgment and conviction
rendered against appellant in the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon,
presiding, for unlawful distribution, offering, agreeing,
consenting or arranging to distribute a controlled or
counterfeit substance, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1953, as amended).

This

Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In asserting ineffective assistance of counsel as an
issue on appeal, the standard for review is first, that the
appellant must show that the counsel's performance was
deficient, and, second, that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984); State v. Montes,
151 Utah. Adv. Rep. 28.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Was appellant denied effective assistance of counsel
because trial counsel failed to challenge for cause a
prospective juror who expressed a concern about being impartial
in a drug case?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES
The Constitutional provisions and statutes relevant to
a determination of this case are:
United States Constitution, Amendment VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the state and district wherein the crime
shrill have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense.
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV:
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the
United States and of the state wherein they
reside. No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law, nor deny to any person
within his jurisdiction the equal
protections of the law.

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii):
Except as authorized by this chapter,
it is unlawful for any person to knowingly
and intentionally: . . . (ii) distribute a
controlled or counterfeit substance or to
agree, consent, offer or arrange to
distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-18 (1953 as amended):
(b) The court may permit counsel or the
defendant to conduct the examination of the
prospective jurors or may itself conduct the
examination. In the later event, the court
may permit counsel or the defendant to
supplement the examination by such further
inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself
submit to the prospective jurors' additional
questions requested by counsel or the
defendant.
(c) A challenge may be made to the
panel or to an individual juror.
(2) A challenge to an individual
juror may be either preemptory or for
cause. A challenge to an individual juror
may be made only before the jury is sworn to
try the action, except the court may, for
good cause, permit it to be made after the
juror is sworn, but before any of the
evidence is presented. In challenges for
cause, the rules relating to challenges to a
panel and hearings thereon shall apply. All
challenges for cause shall be taken first by
the prosecution and then by the defense.
(e) The challenge for cause is an
objection to a particular juror and may be
taken on one or more of the following
grounds:
(14) That a state of mind exists
on the part of the juror with reference to
the cause, or to either party, which will
prevent him from acting impartially and
without prejudice to the substantial rights
of the party challenging; but no person

shall be disqualified as a juror by reason
of having formed or expressed an opinion
upon the matter or cause to be submitted to
such jury, founded upon public rumor,
statements in public journals, or common
notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to
the court that the juror can and will,
notwithstanding such opinion, act
impartially and fairly upon the matter to be
submitted to him.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant, Santiago Diaz Crespo, was charged by
Information with three counts of unlawful distribution,
offering, agreeing, consenting or arranging to distribute a
controlled or counterfeit substance pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1953, as amended).
On May 4, 1989, the jury found appellant guilty of all
three counts.

The trial court, on June 12, 1989, sentenced

appellant to concurrent terms of one to fifteen years at the
Utah State Prison on each of the three counts. Appellant filed
a Notice of Appeal on August 1, 1989.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 7, 9 and 14, 1988, Detective Zane Smith
purchased different quantities of a controlled substance from
appellant Santiago Crespo.

(Vol. II, Tr. 12, 20, 25.)

Detective Smith further testified that he obtained a photograph
and used it to identify the appellant as the person he had been
transacting the drug deals with.

(Vol. II, Tr. 30-31.)

After receiving the testimony of various chain-ofcustody witnesses, the state called David S. Murdock from the

Department of Public Safety and the State Crime Lab.

He

testified that as a criminalist he presently conducts chemical
analysis on drugs to identify controlled substances.
Tr. 56.)

(Vol. II,

After explaining the number of tests that he had

performed, Murdock testified that cocaine was present in the
white powder which had been received by Detective Zane Smith
from the appellant.

(Vol. II, Tr. 64.)

During jury selection, the trial court judge
questioned jurors concerning any of the "panel that has any
involvement with drugs, illegal drugs, whether in your personal
problems or drug problems, or members of your family?"
I, Tr. 15.)

(Vol.

In response to this question, prospective jurors

Swenson, Hudson, Sorenson and Harper raised their hands. After
further questioning of all prospective jurors, the court then
advised everyone that it would question the prospective jurors
listed above in the privacy of chambers.

Each of the

prospective jurors was then called into chambers for individual
questioning.

(Vol. I, Tr. 29.)

Prospective juror Nola Swenson was called into
chambers and was questioned by the court.
son is presently addicted to cocaine.

She related that her

The trial judge then

advised her that the defendant in the case has charges "brought
against him involving drugs and selling and so forth. . . . Is
there anything in regards to your experience with your son and
the problems that have arisen out of that that would impair in

any way your ability to sit in judgment on this case and to be
perfectly fair with both the state and the defendant in
arriving at that decision?"

Prospective juror Swenson

testified that she would be fair.
The court continued in its inquiry and asked whether
she would be prejudiced or biased one way or the other, against
or for either Mr. Crespo or the state, and she responded, "I
think I could be honest and fair."
"Do you know that?"

The court then continued,

And she responded, "Well, I guess you

don't know until you hear the facts."

(Tr. 21-22.) After

further questioning, prospective juror Swenson stated, "Well, I
am very angry at the drug problems."

(Tr. 23.)

After a couple

of questions from counsel for the defendant, and none from the
prosecution, the court asked prospective juror Swenson to
return back to her chair.
The next prospective juror called into chambers for
questioning was Elysa Hudson who stated that a nephew had been
both a user and a pusher.

She described him as having been

convicted for breaking and entering, theft by deception, and
that he had stolen from members of the family who were all just
terrified by him.

Apparently he was using these illegal gains

to support his habit.

The situation had gotten so bad that she

had had to install a burglar alarm system in her home.

After

explaining this to the court and counsel, the court inquired
whether the feelings that she presently had would prevent her

from being an impartial juror in the case.

The prospective

juror Hudson responded, "You know, I would try not to, but I am
afraid it would because I know so personally the terror of
dealing with someone that is addicted to drugs."

(Vol. I,

Tr. 24.)
The court questioned her further regarding whether she
would be able to judge the case only on the facts, without her
personal problems influencing her decision, to which she
responded, "I just don't know if its humanly possible to say
you can dismiss all the things that affect you emotionally and
be totally rational.

I would try to, but I can't say that I

could just accomplish that to the degree that would be
necessary."

(Vol. I, Tr. 25.)

At that point, there were no

further questions from the state or defense counsel, nor was
there a motion to recuse this prospective juror from the venire.
After questioning two other prospective jurors who had
raised their hand, the court inquired of counsel for the state
and the defendant whether they had any further questions.
response, trial counsel for appellant stated, "No.
covered most of my questions.

In

I think you

I was primarily concerned about

drug involvement and drug attitudes."

(Vol. I, Tr. 28.)

The

only other inquiries from the court at that point were as to
the length that counsel anticipated the trial would take.
After that, court and counsel, and the defendant, all returned
back to the courtroom with the jury.

(Vol. I, Tr. 29.)

In court, trial counsel for appellant in response to
the court's inquiry whether he passed the jury for cause,
stated, "Your Honor, as previously indicated, I would have one
challenge."

To which the court responded, "Other than that one

question?", and counsel stated, "No, Your Honor.
the jury for cause."

(Vol. I, Tr. 29.)

I would pass

There is no indication

on the record of any discussion in chambers or otherwise that
would indicate trial counsel's objection and challenge to any
of the prospective jurors.

A review of the record below,

however, reflects that Mrs. Swenson was seated as a juror.
(Vol. I, Tr. 33.)
The jury found appellant guilty of three counts of
unlawful distribution, offering, agreeing, consenting or
arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance,
a second degree felony as charged in Counts I, II and III of
the Information.

(Vol. 3, Tr. 27-28.) On June 12, 1989, the

trial court sentenced appellant to concurrent terms of one to
fifteen years at the Utah State Prison.

(Vol. Ill, Tr. 34-35.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in
failing to challenge for cause juror Nola Swenson who expressed
concern about being impartial in a drug case.

Counsel's error

was prejudicial to appellant and, absent such error, the
outcome of the trial could quite likely have been different.

ARGUMENT
APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL WHEN TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO CHALLENGE
FOR CAUSE A PROSPECTIVE JUROR WHO EXPRESSED A
CONCERN ABOUT BEING IMPARTIAL IN A DRUG CASE.
During voir dire in the instant case, juror Swenson
stated that she was very angry at the drug problems. Upon
questioning by appellant's trial counsel on whether her anger
spilled over to people that supply drugs, she replied, "I don't
know who that is."

(Vol. 1, Tr. 23.)

Trial counsel below

failed to further question Mrs. Swenson about her ability to
remain impartial in rendering a verdict.
did not challenge her for cause.

Trial counsel also

(Vol. 1, Tr. 23.)

Appellant's position is that his trial counsel was ineffective
by not challenging Mrs. Swenson for cause and that this
ineffectiveness ultimately prejudiced his case before the jury.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-18(e)(14) authorizes challenges
of jurors for cause when the prospective juror expresses a
state of mind with reference to the cause or to either party
which could prevent the juror from being impartial. Mrs.
Swenson's son's involvement in drugs led her to state on the
record that she was very angry at the overall drug problem.
This statement warrants an instant challenge for cause in that
Mrs. Swenson could be presumed to have found appellant guilty
even before trial.
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976) stands for the
proposition that a criminal defendant in a state court is

guaranteed an "impartial jury" by the Sixth Amendment as
applicable to the state through the Fourteenth Amendment.

The

Utah Supreme Court in State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah
1977) has also held that "Article I, § 12, Constitution of Utah
. . . guarantees the accused . . . a trial by an impartial
jury."

When counsel below failed to challenge for cause a

venireman who expressed bias against the defendant, all
elements are present for ineffective assistance of counsel
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
This Court has recently enunciated the heavy burden
appellants face in presenting an ineffective assistance of
counsel argument.

In State v. Montes, 151 Utah Advance Reports

28 (Ut. App. Jan. 8, 1991), this Court reiterated that a
convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so
defective as to require reversal of a conviction has two
components.

The first component must establish that counsel's

performance was deficient, and the second component must
establish that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.

Citing Strickland v. Washington.
In Presley v. State, 750 S.W.2nd 602 (Mo. App. 1988),

appellant who had been convicted of several sexual offenses,
moved the court to vacate the judgment and sentence on the
grounds that he had been denied the effective assistance of
counsel at trial.

The court found that counsel's failure to

challenge for cause a venireman who stated during voir dire
that he would be partial to the state, was ineffective.

The

appellate court, in affirming the lower court on the rationale
that counsel's error in not challenging the venireman, though
arguably a mistake, held that it still fell below the
threshold

standard required for competent counsel.

The court

further found that:
The instant situation . . . is an
example of the type the court envisioned by
the language in Strickland: "In certain
Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is
presumed." There was here a denial of the
right to trial by jury. This fits the
Strickland language . . . that "prejudice in
these circumstances is so likely that
case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not
worth the cost."
Presley, 750 S.W.2nd at 607.
In State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981), the
court held under Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-18(2) (1953, as
amended), that a juror may be challenged and removed for cause
if actual bias is shown.

In determining actual bias, the court

stated that if:
. . . the state of mind of the juror leads
to a just inference in reference to the
cause of the parties that he will not act
with entire impartiality. . . . Furthermore,
when a juror has expressed an attitude
indicating prejudice or bias, such cannot be
attenuated by the juror's determination that
he can render an impartial verdict. The
juror cannot be the judge of his
qualification. . . .
Id. at 884.

Applying specifically the rationale of Brooks, as well
as the other cases cited herein, appellant submits that his
trial counsel erred in not challenging for cause Mrs. Swenson
who stated and expressed an opinion and a state of mind that
she was very angry at the drug problems.

(Vol. 1, Tr. 29.)

After expressing this concern and this anger, she was not
further questioned by the court to determine whether she, in
fact, could be rehabilitated.

Trial counsel who had the

responsibility, failed to exercise a challenge for cause when
it was obvious that it was necessary.
Applying the Strickland standard to the instant case,
appellant submits the trial counsel should have known that Mrs.
Swenson was biased.

Her state of mind was such with anger at

the drug problems that she would be unable to render an
impartial verdict.

Counsel's failure to challenge her for

cause "falls outside the range of professionally competent
assistance."
Cir. 1989).

Smith v. Gearinger, 888 F.2d 1334, 1338 (11th
Appellant further submits that the jury that found

him guilty below was composed in part of a person whose state
of mind prevented her from being impartial and that the
presence on the jury of such a juror who has expressed such
anger regarding the drug problem could well have operated to
tip the verdict in a way that harmed appellant.
Appellant further submits that counsel's error is not
the type that can be characterized as a strategic maneuver.

There is no strategy involved about counsel's decision to
impanel a juror who has demonstrated her bias in such an angry
state of mind who was never rehabilitated nor questioned
further in any kind of detail by either the court or trial
counsel.

Inclusion of such a juror on the panel is tantamount

to a denial of the right to a trial by jury.

Appellant further

submits that in this particular Sixth Amendment context>
prejudice should be presumed.
CONCLUSION
Trial counsel's failure to challenge for cause Mrs.
Swenson who expressed such a state of mind of being angry at
the drug problems, denied appellant the effective assistance of
counsel.

This Court should, therefore, vacate appellant's

convictions and sentences on Counts I, II and III and order
they were obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment and
further order that the matter be reversed and a new trial held.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of January, 1991.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

By^
Samtiel Alba
Attorneys for Appellant
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